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Issues of Convergence 
461 
 
Moderator: Mark Patterson* 
Panelists: William Baer** 
 Lawrence Grossman*** 
 Jeffrey Lanning**** 
 Robert Joffe***** 
MR. PATTERSON: Good afternoon, and welcome to the second 
panel.  This panel will talk about the antitrust and regulatory implica-
tions of media convergence and concentration.  Antitrust law and 
communications regulation, and perhaps more specialized bodies of 
law, are, of course, the way that the First Amendment principles that 
we discussed in the first panel are vindicated, because the First 
Amendment does not itself give the government any power to regu-
late private parties.  On the contrary, the First Amendment puts limits 
on what all statutory bodies of law can do.1  So we have a tension 
here.  The First Amendment may place limits on what antitrust and 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, New York, NY.  
Ohio State University, B.S.E.E. 1978; Stanford Law School, J.D. 1991. 
** Director—Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, 
D.C.  Lawrence University, B.A.; Stanford Law School, J.D. 
*** Former President, NBC News and PBS. 
**** Special Counsel—Office of the General Counsel, Federal Communications 
Commission, Washington, D.C.  University of Virginia, B.A.; University of Virginia Law 
School, J.D. 
***** Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, NY. Harvard College, A.B. 
1964; Harvard Law School, J.D. 1967. 
1. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 741 
(1996) (“[T]he First Amendment embodies an overarching commitment to protect speech 
from Government regulation through close judicial scrutiny, thereby enforcing the Con-
stitution’s constraints, but without imposing judicial formulae so rigid that they become a 
straightjacket that disables Government from responding to serious problems.”). 
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regulation can do in its attempt to vindicate First Amendment princi-
ples.  Today we have a panel that comprises both government repre-
sentatives, and industry representatives—so, hopefully, we will get a 
little bit of that tension explored on the panel. 
We have four panelists.  The first speaker is William Baer, who 
is director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition.  The Bureau of 
Competition is the FTC’s antitrust arm.  He will speak about how the 
FTC approaches mergers in the information industries. 
Then we will hear from Lawrence Grossman, the former presi-
dent of NBC News and PBS.  Mr. Grossman writes extensively on 
media issues, and has written a book entitled The Electronic Repub-
lic: Reshaping Democracy in the Information Age.2  He will examine 
the social-policy implications of media mergers from the perspective 
of a media insider. 
The third speaker will be Jeffrey Lanning, who is special counsel 
in the office of the General Counsel for the FCC.  Mr. Lanning ad-
vises the General Counsel on telecommunications matters, particu-
larly those involving mergers, interconnection, local competition, in-
ternational issues and the Internet.  And he will focus his discussion 
on technological and structural change in the industry and will try to 
answer the main question:  “Do the old rules still work?” 
Finally, we will hear from Robert Joffe, a partner at Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore.  He is been deeply involved in communications 
industry mergers and acquisitions, and in litigation in the industry.  
As outside counsel at Time Warner, Mr. Joffe will perhaps provide a 
perspective on the Time Warner-Turner merger that might be in con-
trast with the FTC view.  So perhaps we can generate a little discus-
sion on that basis.  Mr. Baer. 
MR. BAER: Thank you, Mark.  It is a pleasure to be here and a 
pleasure to be on the panel.  We will see whether Bob Joffe and I can 
generate some sparks.  We ended up settling that merger, and the 
question is whether we have settled all our old scores or not.  We will 
see. 
I wanted to talk a little about the trend we are seeing with respect 
 
2. LAWRENCE GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC: RESHAPING DEMOCRACY IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE (Viking Press 1995). 
PANEL II.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:35 PM 
1999] SYMPOSIUM—ECONOMIC & REGULATORY ISSUES 463 
to mergers involving the media, both electronic and print, and talk a 
little bit about the role of antitrust.  If you take as your starting point 
the Communications Act rewrite,3 large portions of which the Su-
preme Court has just affirmed,4 it has been extraordinary what is 
been going on involving the media.  You have Disney-Capital Cities; 
Time Warner-Turner; US West-Continental Cable; a string of radio 
mergers.5  The telecommunications industry has been actively in-
volved, for example Worldcom-MCI; Bell-Atlantic-NYNEX; 
Southwestern Bell-Pac Tel; and more recently, AT&T-TCI.6 
 
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, P. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 1996) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15 & 47 U.S.C.).  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has 
been characterized as the culmination of many years of intensive lobbying, debate, and 
struggle among the various stakeholders of the telecommunications industry, and stands 
as a remarkable and historic legislative achievement. See Patricia E. Koch, A Review of 
Telecommunications Act Handbook: A Complete Reference for Business by Leon T. 
Knauer, et al., 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 55, 55 (1997).  The Telecommunications Act 
“is historically significant because it is the first comprehensive rewrite of America’s 
communications laws in the six decades since the adoption of the Communications Act of 
1934.” Id.  The Telecommunications Act represents a fundamental redirection of Ameri-
can communications policy from “provid[ing] for the regulation of wire and radio com-
munications services in order to make communications services available with ‘adequate 
facilities’ and at ‘reasonable charges,’” to the promotion of competition, “reducing regu-
lation,” and securing “lower prices” and “higher quality” for existing communications 
services, while encouraging “rapid deployment of new telecommunications technolo-
gies.” Id. 
4. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., __ U.S. __, 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999). The Su-
preme Court held that the FCC has rulemaking authority to carry out provisions of Com-
munications Act of 1934, which include local competition provisions added by Tele-
communications Act of 1996; claim that FCC’s general authority to hear complaints 
arising under the Communications Act also gave the FCC authority to review intercon-
nection agreements approved by state commissions was not ripe; FCC’s application of 
“network element” definition to “primary unbundling rule was reasonable”; FCC did not 
adequately consider “necessary and impair” standards of Telecommunications Act when 
FCC gave blanket access to network elements in primary unbundling rule; FCC’s refusal 
to impose facilities-ownership requirement on carriers seeking to lease network elements 
in incumbent local exchange carriers’ (“LEC”) networks was proper; rule forbidding in-
cumbent LECs from separating network elements before leasing them to competitors was 
rational; and “pick and choose” rule was reasonable interpretation of Telecommunica-
tions Act. Id. at 726-738. 
5. See Bryan Gruley, Pitofsky Will Test Marketplace of Ideas Theory in FTC’s Re-
view of Time Warner-Turner Deal, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 9, 1995, at A14. 
6. See James Weiss & Martin Stern, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of 
the FCC and the Justice Department over Telecommunications Transactions, 6 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 195, 196 (1998)(detailing the string of recent and pending media 
and telecommunications mergers and their values). 
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I guess somebody mentioned in the earlier afternoon panel that 
USA Networks and Lycos agreed today to combine Lycos’ Internet 
portal with the Internet and e-commerce activity of the USA Net-
works.7  So there is a lot going on.  And that does not count strategic 
alliances, such as the discussed AT&T-Time Warner alliance that 
would have AT&T and Time Warner together planning to offer local 
telephone service to Time Warner cable subscribers. 
Well, what is the reaction among the antitrust enforcers down in 
Washington?  Well, one is sort of a sensory overload.  We are kind 
of exhausted by just reading the Hart-Scott-Rodino filings8 that come 
in.  I actually had somebody run a quick count.  One out of eight fil-
ings we get, and there were 4,800 last fiscal year, involved the com-
munications industry.9  That is a dramatic increase—there is clearly a 
lot going on. 
Well, what I wanted to talk about in the minutes I have is, first of 
all:  How much should this convergence consolidation, merger ma-
nia, concern us, as antitrust enforcers and as consumers?  And what 
types of things specifically ought to concern us?  And then: How 
much should, how much does, antitrust account for First Amendment 
concerns when we do analyze transactions that involve communica-
tions and the communications industry? 
First, I think most of the merger mania we are seeing is predict-
able, understandable, non-threatening and, however hectic it might 
be, not something that antitrust or consumers ought particularly to be 
concerned about.  We are moving from a regulated environment to a 
more competitive environment.  We are moving at a pace of techno-
logical change which is driving firms to reposition themselves.  Fol-
 
7. See Eben Shapiro & Jon G. Auerbach, USA Networks to Merge Unit with Lycos, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1999, at A3. 
8. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 
201, 90 Stat. 1384 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C § 18a (1994))  There is a require-
ment for notification to both the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the 
FTC of stock and asset acquisitions that give the acquirer an interest of more than fifteen 
million dollars in the acquired company’s stock or assets, if the acquirer and acquirer ex-
ceed some size thresholds. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994). 
9. In 1997 there were more than 3,700 Hart-Scott-Rodino filings which represents a 
twenty percent increase over the previous year and a 142 percent increase over 1991. See 
Robert W. Doyle Jr. & David H. Evans, Your Competitors are Merging—What to Do? 
Here’s How to Grab Agencies’ Interest, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at S41. 
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lowing the 1984 AT&T consent decree,10 we saw the benefits of new 
competition for long-distance telephone service, and we are seeing 
some of that playing out now in other sectors.  Antitrust’s role in this 
is mostly that of cheerleader—feeling good about the fact that we 
have a more competitive environment, which promises to offer con-
sumers more services, output-enhancing conduct, at competitive 
prices. 
Now, what is that we ought to be concerned about?  Well, anti-
trust basically is concerned about those kinds of mergers and acquisi-
tions which potentially injure competition; potentially put someone, 
or just a few, in control of products, enabling them to decrease out-
put, decrease services, and increase price.  What we look for, particu-
larly in a deregulating environment, is the potential for bottlenecks to 
be created, where you have one or two firms with control over key 
inputs. 
These issues came up in terms of the Bell operating companies, 
and providing local access to competitors for telephone service.  You 
can see it in radio mergers, where, if you just have a couple of firms 
who own all of the radio stations in a marketplace, many perhaps 
have control over advertising rates.  You can see it in situations 
where one or just a couple of firms are involved in providing video 
through cable into homes, and are integrated into programming and 
potentially have control over what programming is made available 
and when. 
 
10. See Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), aff’g United States v. 
AT&T, 552 F.Supp 131 (1982).  The consolidated cases before the Supreme Court raised 
questions concerning the settlement of a civil antitrust suit brought by the United States 
against AT&T.  The United States District Court, District of Columbia held that the pro-
posed antitrust consent decree would be approved. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 230-232. 
The antitrust consent decree ordered divestiture by telecommunications corporation of 
local operating companies, removing all but a seven-year ban on “electronic publishing” 
from line-of-business restrictions imposed under a previous decree; imposed business 
restrictions on divested local operating companies; and generally required equal access to 
interconnection facilities. Id.  The district court also mandated division of assets between 
the corporation and that the divested companies were in the “public interest.” See id. 
However, the district court concluded that the decree had to be modified to permit judi-
cial scrutiny and enforcement beyond entry of judgment stage, and the “complaint” and 
“response” procedure would be established to enable third parties to contest any future 
alleged absence of compliance. Id.  The Supreme Court affirmed. See Maryland, 460 
U.S. at 1001. 
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You can see it on a very micro level: with the Communications 
Act rewrite11 and deregulation, there are a few pockets in this coun-
try which are local communities, where we have what is called a ca-
ble overbuild situation.12  That simply means there has not been a 
cable monopoly.  For some reason or another, two cable systems, and 
sometimes three, serve local communities of five thousand, ten thou-
sand, thirty thousand, or fifty thousand people.  We and the FCC 
have studied the phenomenon over the years and found that where 
there is a cable overbuild, where you actually have two cable firms 
potentially bidding to deliver video to your home via the cable.13  
Prices are dramatically lower than they are in monopoly markets, 
even regulated markets.  Thirty or forty percent lower.  Competition 
tends to work. 
Well, in light of the Communications Act rewrite,14 and the po-
tential for video to be more broadly delivered other ways, many of 
 
11. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
12. Overbuilding in the cable industry is a situation in which one cable company 
establishes service in an area already served by another. See Comrad M. Shumadine et 
al., Antitrust and the Media 539 PLI/PAT 7, 352 (1998).  The effect of overbuilding varies 
depending on the viewpoint of those operators attempting to enter into the market or an 
incumbent operator. See id.  Those desiring to enter a market argue that overbuilds not 
only protect consumers but are consistent with the industry’s general First Amendment 
arguments. See id. at 352-53.  Incumbent operators desire to avoid direct competition for 
a limited subscriber base. See id. at 353.  Some state legislators have addressed the prob-
lem of overbuilding with a compromise such as Florida, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Illi-
nois. See id.  These states have passed laws preventing a second operator from entering a 
market and overbuilding in the most desirable localities. See id.  Overbuilding is becom-
ing more prevalent in the cable industry and overbuilds will become even more common 
as cable rates rise. See id. 
13. See Richard E. Wiley, Competition, Consolidation, Convergence and Chal-
lenge: Developments in Communications Law, 538 PLI/PAT 1123, 1166 (1998). Local 
Exchange Carriers may use their wireline networks to provide traditional cable services, 
subject to compliance with all cable laws and regulations, including those imposed by 
local governments through independent franchise agreements. See id. at 1165.  Absent a 
waiver from the FCC or qualification under a narrow set of statutory exceptions, Local 
Exchange carriers may not acquire more than a ten percent financial or management in-
terest in an incumbent cable system located within the Local Exchange Carrier’s local 
telephone service area. See id. at 1166.  Ameritech, the only “Baby Bell” that has deci-
sively entered the video market via this option, has done so through an aggressive pro-
gram of overbuilds. See id. Ameritech has received local approval to operate cable sys-
tems in dozens of communities throughout the United States, principally in Illinois, 
Michigan, and Ohio. See id. 
14. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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the firms that are now in that competitive cable environment in local 
communities have sought to merge with one another, and they have 
asked us to approve it.  Well, we have gone and taken a look.  And 
although convergence is occurring—DBS is increasingly an alterna-
tive to cable—over the long run it may be possible for the telephone 
company, with its copper wire into your home, to upgrade that wire 
and provide video services. 
Right now competition really has not matured to the point where, 
in fact, there are real price-sensitive substitutes for the cable firms.  
So we have disallowed those, or refused to allow those mergers, up 
until now.  Over time, as DBS, the telephone companies and the 
Internet provide meaningful and price-competitive alternatives for 
consumers, those sorts of mergers can and should be allowed.  So 
what enforcement has to take into account is the pace of change, the 
nature of the change, and the degree of competition that exists today, 
and that may exist in the future. 
Another example, on a broader scale, was the Department of Jus-
tice’s challenge last year to Primestar’s effort to buy the DBS assets 
of News Corp and MCI.15  The concern in that case was that Prime-
star would gain control over the last orbital slot available for inde-
pendent DBS firms to develop.16  So you had a strategic acquisition.  
It is one of the kind that would create a potential bottleneck, giving 
Primestar--which is a consortium of cable companies--more control 
than the Department of Justice thought appropriate over a key tech-
nology that is necessary for there to be independent competition to 
develop.17 
In Time Warner-Turner matter—which the Commission re-
 
15. See Roger Fillion, Echostar Bid Tops Direct TV’s $600 Million Offer Made for 
Primestar’s Assets, DENVER POST, Feb. 27, 1999, at C1. In November 1998, Primestar’s 
agreement to buy $1.1 billion worth of strategic satellite assets held by News Corp. and 
MCI WorldCom Inc. fell apart. See id.  In December 1998, EchoStar bought the News 
Corp. and MCI satellite assets in a deal worth approximately $1.2 billion. See id.  Echo-
Star Communications Corp. offered to buy highly coveted satellite assets from Primestar 
Inc. for $600 million, exceeding the $500 million bid by the number one satellite-
television provider, DirecTv Inc. See id.  EchoStar is targeting space on a high-powered 
satellite slot that would allow it to send programs across the continental United States. 
See id. 
16. See id. 
17. See id. 
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viewed with Bob Joffe’s help a couple years ago—we had some lim-
ited concerns.18  We saw the potential synergies and benefits, that the 
companies identified to us, of combining the Turner programming 
with the Time Warner programming and cable distribution—but we 
had specific areas where there were real concerns over the integrated 
firm’s ability to control how competition would evolve.  Competition 
at the programming level, where an integrated Time Warner might 
want to favor its own programming—and, therefore, deny consumers 
the benefits of competing programming content through video—or 
situations where Time Warner, as a cable provider, might want to 
limit the availability of programming to a DBS firm that would seek 
to serve territory in competition with Time Warner. 
And the relief we structured in that case was designed to prevent 
that kind of discrimination—prevent the use of the bottlenecks in a 
way that would enable Time Warner to advantage itself at the ex-
pense of competition—and, ultimately, at the expense of consum-
ers.19 
Now, I also raise the question of whether there ought to be spe-
cial rules that antitrust enforcers apply to the media because it con-
cerns the First Amendment.  I think there are probably three views.  
One is that antitrust ought to be more cautious, because we are get-
ting in the realm of content, freedom of speech, and First Amend-
ment protection.  Therefore, we ought to do less than we normally 
would.  Second is a more aggressive view:  that antitrust, because of 
diversity concerns, ought to intervene more aggressively, to make 
sure that we have a multiplicity of voices. 
Then there is the view, which is the one I subscribe to which is 
that we do our job as antitrust enforcers most effectively when we 
apply the same basic standards that we do in other industries, to en-
sure that consumers have a diversity of options—whether it be 
voices, or products or services, at competitive prices.  And I would 
say the courts, over the years, have basically subscribed to that view. 
There is a case involving AT&T dating back to 1982.20  A Mary-
 
18. See Gruley, supra note 5, at A14. 
19. See Time Warner Signs FTC Order to Allow Acquisition of Turner, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 15, 1996, at B8. 
20. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D. Cir. 1982); see supra note 
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land court stated that the values underlying the First Amendment co-
incide quite squarely with the policy of the antitrust laws.21  In 1945, 
the Supreme Court wrote that the First Amendment, far from provid-
ing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, provides 
powerful reasons to the contrary.22  The First Amendment rests on 
the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information, 
from diverse and antagonistic sources, is essential to the welfare of 
the public.  That a free press is a condition of a free society.23  Surely 
a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow 
of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations—mergers 
that give market power—a refuge if they impose restraints upon that 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom. 
So I think First Amendment considerations do not, ought not 
cause us to be more cautious.  The flip side is whether they cause us 
to be more aggressive.  I think that gets us very close to getting into 
content issues and being the arbiter of who ought to see what, and 
under what circumstances.  That basically focusing our antitrust en-
forcement in the communications area, as we do in other areas: Will 
a bottleneck be created?  Will market power be generated from a 
merger or acquisition?  Will we allow there to be less choice, higher 
prices?  By doing that, we do our job.  We make sure that com-
petition prevails, and that the consumer benefits from the presence of 
that competition. 
MR. PATTERSON: Next, we have Lawrence Grossman. 
MR. GROSSMAN: As we talk about antitrust, and as a law-
school dropout, I sort of throw up my hands and give up on that is-
sue.  I feel sorry for Bill and his colleagues at the FCC and the FTC.  
It is a hopeless situation.  I love the way the broadcasters, and the 
phone companies, and the media and the newspapers all wrap them-
selves around the First Amendment, in every possible effort to make 
sure that they have a monopoly, and that the government does not in-
 
10 and accompanying text. 
21. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 184. 
22. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (“[The First 
Amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a 
free press is a condition of a free society.”). 
23. See id. 
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terfere with it. 
There is a wonderful statement by Judge Learned Hand in the 
AP24 case in which he said, I am paraphrasing, he did it much more 
eloquently—it cannot possibly be that, because of the First Amend-
ment, we, the government, has no right to stop major companies 
from interfering in the First Amendment.25  And, yet, this is what 
happens all the time. 
We are dealing with an industry of such tremendous change, with 
the huge conglomerations such as AT&T buying the second-largest 
cable company, and making partnerships with Time Warner, and 
making joint ventures with every other cable company around.  And 
the FCC, holding a hearing, on loosening the restrictions on televi-
sion ownership, so that major broadcasters—who now make fifty 
and sixty percent cash-flow margins with their stations—can own 
two or more television stations in a single market.  And perhaps 
even, they argue, should own the one newspaper in a market, as well 
as a television station and a radio station. 
I do not know how these guys are going to contend with this, and 
I do not see it stopping.  I think we just have to look at other ways of 
developing, the kinds of things that are necessary to improve the 
quality of our civilization.  I am under no illusions about these huge 
conglomerates controlling, operating, and owning the major sources 
of information.  And it is happening in the Internet already.  It is 
wonderful to see the parallel between the Internet and radio.  The 
Internet is an explosive, wonderfully uncontrolled medium, but radio 
used to be that way too before the government stepped in and allo-
cated channels, in order to stop interference. 
In the 1930s, certain members of congress wanted to allow non-
profit universities and religious institutions, and public-service insti-
tutions, to own major commercial licenses for radio.  The broadcast-
ers responded:  That is not necessary.  There are so many radio sta-
tions, going seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day.  We will 
never be able to fill them with our own stuff, commercial stuff.  So 
 
24. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
25. Id. at 374.  “[T]he mere fact that a person is engaged in publishing, does not ex-
empt him from ordinary municipal law, so long as he remains unfettered in his own selec-
tion of what to publish.”  Id. 
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there will be plenty of room for nonprofit, costly public-service, edu-
cation, information and so on.26 
And the same thing is happening today with the Internet.  It is in-
conceivable, but very soon the Internet will be dominated, as it has 
already begun to be dominated by a gigantic electronic shopping 
mall; without the capacity to promote and to market, and with only a 
few access vehicles—like America Online, or AT&T-TCI—that will 
channel all the traffic. 
We are seeing this really tremendously changing industry move 
so fast, it is so hard to keep up with, it is so hard to regulate, or so 
hard even to deregulate, or to consider what is proper.  All of us hate 
the government being involved in any of this.  So I believe that we 
need to start developing some very new, public policies and struc-
tures for telecommunications. 
And my inclination, at this point, having worked both sides—the 
commercial level and in the public level—is to say:  “Let the com-
mercial guys go do whatever they please.”  At some point we are go-
ing to have to spread the goods a little bit, and not let anybody domi-
nate all of the entry points.  I mean, there are many more channels 
and far fewer gatekeepers.  Going back to my historical analogies 
again, radio used to be a locally owned business, by and large, that 
served local communities.  Today there is a huge increase in the 
number of radio stations, and because the bars have been let down, 
radio is virtually an oligopoly. 
There are three or at the most, four companies that control almost 
all of the commercial radio stations,27 and radio is doing virtually 
nothing to serve local interests anymore.  The only major journalism 
in radio is on public radio, not commercial radio.  The only national 
network in radio is the public radio network, not commercial radio.  
The only original productions, programming, performances, arts and 
culture in radio are produced by public radio not commercial radio.  
 
26. See Charles R. Shipan, Interest Groups, Judicial Review, and the Origins of 
Broadcast Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 549, 555-567 (1997) (discussing the role that 
the struggle between commercial and non-commercial interests played in shaping the 
Communications Act of 1934). 
27. A detailed list of which media companies own what entities is available at 
Aaron Moore, Who Owns What, (visited April 5, 1999) <http://www.cjr.owners>. 
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And I think that shows a lesson to us. 
The same is happening in television and will happen to the Inter-
net because there are huge amounts of money to be made.  Now, for 
the first time, these new media are being driven entirely in one direc-
tion, by the marketplace.  If they are run by companies, that is ex-
actly the direction they should be drawn in because the job of com-
panies is to make money, to earn profits, to increase value for their 
shareholders and for their management.  They have no particular in-
terest in the public interest. 
The fact is:  what makes money in the marketplace amongst oth-
ers is entertainment.  We are awash in entertainment, no matter how 
many channels we have.  There is an excess of sameness with enter-
tainment and business and commerce.  So we are developing--as we 
see today with the USA Networks buying an Internet portal, business 
and commerce to a fare-thee-well. 
There are major elements however, that are not being fulfilled.  
Even radio and television, by the way, when they began, had an un-
derpinning of a public-interest law.  That is pretty much by the 
boards these days.  We are seeing plenty of giving the people what 
they want and very little of giving the people what they need, be-
cause it is being driven by the marketplace.  You can make money 
from giving the people what they want, but it costs money to give 
people what they need. 
What we need for a quality civilization, is, number one, educa-
tion and not just education front-loaded for children, but education 
for lifelong learning; job retraining, as our society is increasingly 
growing older, and more mature with senior citizens, with much time 
on their hands as they retire from work.  That costs money, it does 
not usually make money. 
We see a tremendous decline in civic information and civic par-
ticipation, as we get into an economy and a politics of referenda and 
ballot initiatives.  Secretaries of State are tearing their hair out trying 
to get information out to people.  The latest poll I saw, in terms of 
coverage of state politics, the most recent California election, was 
something like three percent that was done on television.28  And 
 
28. See generally Steve Weinstein, Where’s TV When You Need It? Not at the Sen-
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nothing, virtually, on radio anymore.  You have to buy your way in if 
you want to expose yourself to the people.  So we have got to figure 
out some route, some way, of getting civic and citizenship informa-
tion out to the public. 
The third non-marketplace-driven effort is arts and culture, par-
ticularly original arts and high culture in society.  It does not make 
money.  In the old days, NBC did a dozen operas a year.  When was 
the last time you saw an opera on television?  Only on public televi-
sion, and they are very rare, because they are very expensive.  The 
fourth area is in public health and health information. 
So it seems to me you have to contrive a system--and we have 
the opportunity to do so--that provides the kinds of services that our 
civilization needs but the marketplace will not provide.  And the way 
you deal with that is to build on what we already have.  We have 
public broadcasting, an afterthought—weak, terribly under-funded.  
It is being required, forced by Congress and the FCC, to convert to 
digital which is a very expensive undertaking.29  There is going to be 
a lot of electronic real estate available to use for public-interest pur-
poses, but we have a history that shows that even if the real estate is 
available, if there is no money to fill it up, it goes to waste. 
The public access channels on cable are virtually entirely unused.  
The last I saw, eighteen percent of public access, education and gov-
ernment channels were being used. And when they are used, they are 
 
ate Races, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1992, at A1 (discussing problem of low television cover-
age of political races). 
29. See Kyle Pope, Hype Definition: Waiting for HDTV, Don’t Go Dumping Your 
Old Set Just Yet; Promise of Digital Television is Fading as Broadcasters Complain 
About Costs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1997, at A1.  An alliance of United States companies 
devised a standard for HDTV that was adopted by the FCC in December 1996. See id.  In 
the spring of 1997, the FCC began to distribute the valuable digital “real estate,” on a 
promise from broadcasters that all of the nation’s consumers would be receiving digital 
television, which includes high definition, in just nine years. Id.  By 2006, all of the na-
tion’s television stations must be broadcasting a digital signal or risk losing their FCC 
license. See id.  Local television stations have to install new transmitters, new digital pro-
duction facilities and new towers at a cost of between $8 million and $10 million each, 
which represents approximately $16 billion nationwide. See id.  The networks as well 
face the additional costs of new digital production equipment, transmitters, even cameras 
and new sets. See id.  At NBC alone, the cost of conversion has already exceeded $50 
million while Fox Broadcasting estimates that it will have to pay $100 million to fully 
convert its twenty-two owned-and-operated stations. See id. 
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virtually unwatchable.  Public radio and television are woefully un-
der-financed, and there are too many stations.  Everyone likes to 
build stations and nobody likes to pay for programs.  And the gov-
ernment is cutting back on that. 
But we also have great institutions and traditions in this country 
that are enormous suppliers of the information and education that our 
society needs—the library systems, the research universities, com-
munity colleges, museums, as well as our public broadcasting sys-
tem.  It seems to me it is time that we began to bring them together.  
Because, unlike television, these institutions have as much of a stake 
in the digital age as companies do.  They have to reach out to the 
home, but beyond their walls.  We cannot afford to let them be by-
passed in the telecommunications age, the digital age. 
We have the peculiar and wonderful opportunity, because the 
conversion to digital television not only means high-definition, crys-
tal-clear pictures and good sound, but it also means access, through 
the television screen, to data.  You do not have to just get stock 
quotes and sports statistics—you can actually begin to get real in-
formation about ballot initiatives and training.  It means interactivity, 
so you can be connected with the World Wide Web, and receive e-
mail, and take courses and get feedback. 
When digital comes in, everyone is either going to have to get 
converters, or buy new television sets.  So you want to make that 
stuff available to as wide an audience as possible.  It seems to me the 
strategy now is to begin to pull together the public broadcasting 
community; the education community; the arts and performances and 
culture community; the information community such as the libraries, 
the Library of Congress, the local libraries; the museums, and begin 
to develop strategies for them to use this public-interest real estate.  
The goal is to develop information superhighways and public access 
to it in a meaningful way, and figure out ways to pay for it.  One way 
to pay for it, if you are going to use the public airwaves, and exploit 
them, then you, as a commercial enterprise, ought to pay a fee for 
that. 
We have no history of that in this country, and it is not likely, po-
litically, to be done.  Now that we are going to auction off, the analog 
channels, there are pockets of opportunity—if we really believe in 
that sort of thing—for the libraries and the universities, and the 
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community colleges, and the museums, and the public-broadcasting 
interests, to come together and really go after some major funding, so 
that we can fulfill the promise of the telecommunications age, even 
as our commercial side is exploiting them for increasing profits. 
So, in the most simpleminded kind of way, I give up on the ques-
tion of antitrust.  We are going to have huge centralized control of 
these media.  We have a history now of the more channels, the more 
access we have, the fewer gatekeepers.  Cable is the best example 
there is.  There is one gatekeeper with access to all these channels.  
Unless they have a piece of it, of a network, you are not going to get 
on.  Now unless, the networks have a piece of your program, your 
program is not going to get on a network. 
So we have got to develop an alternative strategy and the alterna-
tive strategy is really the obligation of the public interest institutions 
to take a leaf from the book of the commercial institutions.  The 
name of the game is networking and convergence, come together, act 
as a heavy-duty political powerhouse.  Insist on—along with the 
support of the American public—getting the civic information and 
the educational capacity, and the public-health capacity, and the arts 
and culture capacity, to be used, at least on the public interest side, to 
improve the quality of our society and fulfill the needs of a decent 
civilization.  Thank you. 
MR. PATTERSON: Next, we have Jeffrey Lanning. 
MR. LANNING: The first thing I am going to tell you is that 
the things I say today are solely attributable to me personally, and 
may not be attributed to the Federal Communications Commission.  
Therefore, to the extent I make mistakes, or do not make sense, it 
is my fault, and does not reflect badly on my agency. 
MR. PATTERSON:The same holds true for all of the good 
things he says. 
MR. LANNINIG: The first comment that I want to make is 
about what “convergence” really means.  Convergence has become 
one of those buzzwords that is used in many different situations, 
and often means a lot of different things.  As a result, it may end 
up having no real meaning, unless we explicitly think about it and 
give it one. 
When I speak about convergence, I am thinking about the 
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Internet, as well as the idea that cable networks will be used to 
transmit telephony, and telephony networks may be used to trans-
mit video programming.30  In fact, at this time the main source of 
convergence is from the variety of networks that are being used to 
connect to the Internet.31  The Internet, in turn, is being used to 
transmit many different services, including telephony and some 
video. 
The fundamental principle at work in this convergence is that 
new technologies—principally the use of digital transmission and 
the deployment of increased bandwidth—are making it possible for 
communications networks to deliver services that they could not 
provide before.32  One of the most important examples is the abil-
ity of residential consumers to buy books, airline tickets, do their 
banking, and invest online, at any time of the day or night.33  Some 
of these services used to be available only to businesses, and others 
have never before been available. 
The most media-oriented development attributed to conver-
gence is that publishing material online can be dramatically 
cheaper and easier than publishing books, magazines, or newspa-
 
30. See Thomas Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 1, 4 (1996).  The very essence of modern telecommunications is technologi-
cal convergence.  Telecommunications is the electronic transmission of information in 
audio, video, or simple data form. See id.  In 1934, telecommunication by wire was a 
natural monopoly, subject to common carrier regulation, characterized by speaker and 
listener privacy and virtually devoid of censorship while telecommunication through the 
air was broadcasting. See id. at 6.  Today there is technological convergence with satel-
lites, microwave, television, computers, fiber optics, and the World Wide Web. The 
growth of these technologies have “shattered” the previous “illusions of tightly compart-
mentalized technologies.” Id. 
31. See id. at 4-6. 
32. See Norman Redlich & David R. Lurie, First Amendment Issues Presented by 
the “Information Superhighway”, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1446, 1446 (1995).  Tradi-
tional electronic and written media is being replaced by “broadband” digital networks 
carrying an array of electronic information services which will provide users with a broad 
range of new means of receiving news and other information, of communicating, of con-
ducting business transactions and of being entertained. See id.  Digital technology facili-
tates the transmission of an unlimited range of information that traditional forms of 
communications were incapable of producing. See id. at 1447. 
33. See George Anders, Click and Buy: Why and Where—Internet Commerce is 
Succeeding, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1998, at R9. 
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pers.34  Consequently, it is becoming easier for most people to dis-
tribute their ideas to large numbers of people, and to do so without 
having to rely on professional publishers.35  This development is 
caused by the same underlying factors that are causing conver-
gence—digitization of voice and video services, and the deploy-
ment of higher bandwidth transmission services to residential con-
sumers.36 
We are seeing the pace of convergence accelerate because a lot 
of legal barriers to providing services have been removed, particu-
larly by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.37  These barriers 
might not have been removed but for the threat that convergence 
would happen anyway.  However, the removal of explicit legal 
barriers to entry has made it possible for cable companies to offer 
telephony, and for telephone companies to offer video program-
ming, and for other companies, even power companies, to begin 
offering both video programming and telephony.38 
Not all legal barriers have been removed, and I will take a 
moment to put in my two cents about cable overbuilding.39  Some 
of the biggest legal barriers to cable competition are still in place.  
There are still build-out requirements, so that if a competitor would 
like to serve a few buildings in Manhattan, and the system crosses 
a public right of way, that competitor will have to agree to serve all 
of the franchise area, which is either upper or lower Manhattan, 
 
34. See Laura Fording, Cyberscope: Virtual Vanity, NEWSBYTES, Apr. 8, 1999, at 1.  
With online publishing, books are prepared, then stored in print-ready digital form and 
printed in single copies as ordered. See id.  In the absence of large print runs, the 
costs to both author and publisher are reduced significantly compared to traditional van-
ity-press publication. See id. 
35. See Tony Jackson, Media Futures: The Greatest Story in the Book World–
Jonathan Newcomb tells Tony Jackson that Digital Technology will Transform the Indus-
try, LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES, July 31, 1995, at 9. 
36. See Jamie Nafziger, Time to Pay Up: Internet Service Providers’ Universal Ser-
vice Obligations Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16 J. MARSHALL COMPUTER 
& INFO L. 37, 69 (1997). 
37. Telecommunications Act of 1996, P. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 1996) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15 & 47 U.S.C.).  See also supra note 3 and accompanying 
text. 
38. See Krattenmaker, supra note 30, at 5. 
39. See Shumadine, supra note 13, at 352. 
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and to do so within a relatively short time.40  Moreover, the com-
petitor will have to provide the same programming to all of its cus-
tomers—it cannot compete by tailoring its programming to indi-
vidual neighborhoods. 
The key point about convergence, however, is that it is mostly 
happening at the service level.  In other words, although there is 
increasing use of terrestrial wireless and satellite delivery, most of 
the developments are about using the existing wires owned by  
phone, cable, or power companies, to carry more services.41  To 
date, we have not seen a large deployment of alternative distribu-
tion facilities in residential neighborhoods.  This is not a criticism.  
The fact that the pipes we have can carry competing services is a 
really big improvement—but it is a recognition that we are not yet 
looking at an explosion in the sources of communications services 
available to residential customers.  Personally, I think the service 
providers have to be in place first, then they will create the demand 
for the alternative facilities. 
With respect to regulation by the Federal Communications 
Commission, the fact that convergence, to date, has mostly been a 
service-level phenomenon is rather important.  The FCC’s respon-
sibility is primarily over the facilities and spectrum being used  by 
communications providers.42  The FCC is much less concerned 
with the content that is provided.  Yes, we do have some issues 
with content, such as political advertising and children’s program-
ming.43  Even so, broadcast regulation is much more about the use 
 
40. Generally, cable is regulated at the local level, typically through franchise 
agreements between cable operators and local governments. See MICHAEL D. SCOTT ET 
AL., SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW § 24.02[B] (2d ed. 1997). Build-out requirements are 
encompassed within such local regulations, whereby a cable operator under a franchise 
agreement is required to build-out its priority service area before it could expand to an-
other service area. See Kathleen A. Marron & Agnes E.C. Brandon, Consumer Com-
plaints:  An Overview of Antitrust, Predatory Pricing, Competitive Access, Mergers, 
Overbuilds, Unfair Competition and Other Consumer Trade Issues, 535 PLI/PAT 491, 
556-57 (1998). 
41. See M.A. Nelson, Bell Atlantic’s Wayne Budd talks ‘Convergence’, Competi-
tion, MASS HIGH TECH., July 27, 1998, at 6. 
42. See Jason E. Freidrich, Thinkable Mergers, The FCC’s Evolving Public Interest 
Standard, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 261, 263 (1998); Krattenmaker, supra note 30, at 5-
6. 
43. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(a)(ii) (1999) (regulating political advertising); 47 
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of the spectrum than the content, and content is largely outside the 
FCC’s jurisdiction in the telecom arena.  In fact, it is the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”), not the FCC, that deals with the ob-
scenity regulation in the telecommunications area, including the 
rules regulating the delivery of pornography over telephone lines.44 
A principal effect of convergence, or at least of the increases in 
bandwidth and digitization that are making convergence possible 
through the Internet, is that smaller organizations, small businesses 
and individual families, can take advantage of services that were 
previously available only to large organizations.45  This is dramati-
cally demonstrated by the growth of on-line services such as travel 
agents, brokers and banks.46  In the media environment, the reduc-
tion in transaction and production costs produced by the Internet is 
making it possible for far more things to be published, and by far 
more people.  In fact, everybody can be their own publisher on the 
World Wide Web and have their material seen all over the world.47 
Another major effect of convergence is legal uncertainty.  In a 
way, this is the point of convergence:  do the old rules still work, 
or do we need new rules for a world with converging communica-
tions technologies?  This issue was one of the principal sources of 
debate in our review of the merger of AT&T and the cable giant 
TCI.48  Cable systems have generally considered themselves 
broadcast-type companies, and many of the rules that apply to ca-
ble service are analogous to the rules that apply to television 
broadcasters.  Now they are beginning to provide Internet access 
services and offer some content of their own.  Whereas they argue 
that these services are just like their cable services, other providers 
of Internet access services contend that they are really more like 
 
C.F.R. § 75.3526(e)(11)(iii) (1999) (regulating children’s television). 
44. See Krattenmaker, supra note 30, at 203. 
45. See Gruley, supra note 5, at A14. 
46. See Anders supra note 33, at R9. 
47. See Greg Alwang, American Online 4.0 (Internet/Web/Online Service  Informa-
tion) (Evaluation), P.C. MAG., Apr. 20, 1999, available in  WESLAW, MAGSPLUS File 
(discussing subscriber options, including creating their own web page). 
48. See John Simons, Faced with ‘Convergence’ FCC Takes Closer Look at Inter-
net Access Via Cable, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1998, at B8.  “As the Internet, cable, and 
telephone services begin to merge into a single medium, the FCC has had difficulty fit-
ting them into its decade-old, narrow regulatory slots.” Id. 
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telephone services, which are covered by different rules.49 
I think that one of the things that is often overlooked in many 
discussions of convergence is that some of the principal economic 
distinctions between different communications networks are not 
changing or converging.  We still have a fundamental distinction 
between broadcast-type networks and switched networks.50 
Broadcast-type networks include cable systems, radio stations, 
and television stations (and probably newspapers too). In these 
networks, there is one speaker—the network operator—and many 
listeners.  In other words, these are networks of communications 
from “one to many,” and generally the communication only goes 
in one direction, from the “one” to the “many.”  The network op-
erator is deemed a speaker for First Amendment purposes, but it 
also has responsibility for its speech—it can be held liable for dis-
tributing indecent speech for example.51 
In broadcast-type networks, the network operator is actually 
choosing the content that is being communicated.  Capacity is lim-
ited.  There is only so much time and so much spectrum available, 
even in a cable system—so there simply is not room for all of the 
programming that is available to be distributed.  Moreover, many 
listeners, if not all of them, actually prefer that there be a measure 
of exclusion—the service is more valuable with exclusion because 
it is easier for customers to find the programming they want.  The 
big policy questions, then, are whose programming gets excluded, 
and what limits, if any, should be placed on the operator’s right to 
choose. 
A fundamentally different network, at least economically, is a 
 
49. See Krattenmaker, supra note 30, at 6. 
50. See Jonathan D. Blake, The National Information Infrastructure Initiative and 
the Emergence of the Electronic Superhighway, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 397, 403 (1994) (de-
scribing broadcast type networks). Switched networks are traditional land-line telephone 
services.  See Celnet Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 149 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. ‘998).  
See also Daniel L. Brenner, Telephone Company Entry Into Video Services, 67 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 97, 144-145 (1991). 
51. See generally Philip H. Miller, Note, New Technology, Old Problem: Determin-
ing the First Amendment Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1147, 1187 (1993) (describing the First Amendment status of cable operators); see also 
Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE 
L.J. 899 (1998). 
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network like a telephone network.  In the interest of full disclosure, 
let me say that I actually spend most of my time working with 
telephone issues.  These networks involve individual users, or 
groups of users, engaging in two-way communication with other 
individual users or groups of users.  I generally call them switched 
or “one to one” type networks, but there must be a better term.52  
The basic point, however, is that the user wants to both send and 
receive communication, and wants to engage in communication 
with specific people as opposed to a general audience of many 
people. 
In one-to-one networks, capacity is actually fairly unlimited 
over the long run.  The choice of communication is made by the 
user, not the network operator.  Telephone companies are not 
speakers for First Amendment purposes, and they have very little 
responsibility for the content that is available over the telephone 
network.53  Instead of capacity, the limiting principle is reach.  The 
network that can be used to reach the most people is the most valu-
able.  This phenomenon is known as network economics, and it is 
likely to lead to “natural monopolies” without a requirement that 
providers interconnect with each other.  In other words, the very 
kind of exclusion that is essential to a broadcast-type network is 
very undesirable for a switched network. 
I do not see any reason why the fundamental distinction be-
tween broadcast and switched networks will diminish or go away 
as a result of convergence.  The fact that the same physical net-
work is being used to provide both kinds of services will not 
change the economics.  Therefore, I do not think that we need one 
unifying set of rules that apply to all networks.  Instead, I believe 
that things will work out fairly well if, but only if, broadcast ser-
vices are covered by rules that adequate address the economics of 
limited capacity and switched services are covered by rules that 
address network effects. 
Now, for a few thoughts about the large number of recent 
communications mergers—from my perspective, one big reason is 
 
52. See Brenner, supra note 50, at 145. 
53. See Redlich & Lurie, supra note 32, at 1449 (explaining that telephone compa-
nies do not have “speaker” status for First Amendment purposes). 
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that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 removed a lot of legal 
barriers to mergers.54  This reason is particularly evident in the 
case of broadcast television and radio mergers.  The restrictions 
that existed in the FCC’s ownership rules with substantial support 
from Congress, prevented the realization of substantial economies 
of scale.55  For example, it is probably just as easy to sell advertis-
ing for eight stations as for one, and it probably does not cost much 
more to do so.  Moreover, customers buying advertising time are 
probably interested in buying packages that include stations reach-
ing different demographic groups.  I do think we have to be careful 
here, and that the new ownership rules may permit mergers that are 
truly harmful—cases where one or two owners have all of the lis-
teners.  With proper enforcement of competitive conditions, how-
ever, these mergers will be beneficial for society, at least from an 
economic perspective. 
I think realization of economies of scale is also one factor be-
hind consolidation in the cable industry.  There is another factor, 
uncertainty, which I suspect is also the primary reason for mergers 
between telephone companies, or, at least, the ones between local 
telephone companies.  Nobody is really sure what telecom services 
are going to emerge as the most important, and the same is true to 
an even greater degree with Internet access services.  In fact, it is 
not even clear what sort of transmission media will be used by the 
preferred providers. 
In times of uncertainty, size can offer a form of security for 
corporations. It gives them more time to respond to change before 
losses begin to seriously affect share prices.  It can also provide in-
creased diversity across services and geographic areas which can 
both reduce risk of loss from competition or changing tastes and 
increase the possibilities for repositioning.  In this time of uncer-
tainty, I do not think anybody really knows where the real profit 
centers will be located.  It may be like the current telephone indus-
try, where the profits are closely tied to the distribution network 
 
54. See Krattenmaker, supra note 30, at 13. 
55. See id. at 7.  Krattenmaker notes, for example, that television systems cannot 
operate local cable systems; telephone companies cannot offer cable television; and cable 
television companies cannot offer telephony, although both run wires for electronic 
communications into the same houses. See id. 
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and value-added distribution services.  Or, it may be in the content 
business, like in broadcast networks, which is why there is so 
much interest in “portals,”56 which function as vehicles for filtering 
and selecting content to make it more convenient for users. 
Finally, I am going to take a couple of minutes to address an is-
sue that has received a lot of attention and air time in Washington: 
why is the FCC reviewing mergers when we already have an FTC 
and Department of Justice (“DOJ”) approving mergers from an an-
titrust perspective?57  First, although several members of Congress 
like to act as if it were not true, as of now, federal law clearly re-
quires the FCC to determine that transfers of licenses and tele-
communications lines serve the public interest.58  The courts have 
clearly found that effect of competition is one of the factors that we 
must consider in this public interest analysis.59  Accordingly, we 
have to make an affirmative determination about the competitive 
effect of a merger that requires the transfer of communications li-
censes or telecommunications lines. 
When the FCC makes its public interest determination, it can 
and does take into account the antitrust agencies’ conclusions re-
garding competitive effects.60  Unfortunately, they generally do not 
issue written decisions or make formal findings unless they chal-
lenge mergers.  Consequently, we have a harder time explaining to 
a judge any reliance on the non-action of the DOJ or the FTC.  It 
could be they thought the merger was good but did not have the re-
sources to do anything about it, which we understand to be the case 
more often than one might expect. 
There is another big difference between the findings of the an-
titrust agencies and those we are required to make.  They have the 
 
56. See Andrea Petersen, What is a Portal and Why are There so Many of Them?  
Once Gateways to the Web, The Keep Expanding, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1998, at B8 (ex-
amining the confusion surrounding the “definition” of a portal). 
57. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 197(discussing the overlap between the 
FCC, the FTC and the DOJ and the resulting conflicts). 
58. See Friedrich, supra note 42 (citing In re Application of NYNEX and Bell Atlan-
tic For Consent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corporation and its Subsidiaries, Memo-
randum Opinion Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 1985, ¶ 2 (1997)). 
59. See id. 
60. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 204 (examining three examples of telecom-
munications mergers reviewed by the FCC and the DOJ). 
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burden of proof that a merger is bad, whereas we must affirma-
tively determine that a merger is good.61  There is a large middle 
ground there—mergers that are not so bad that it can be proven to 
the satisfaction of a court, but are also too bad for us to prove that 
they are good on appeal, although we do get a lot of deference 
from courts. 
The FCC’s analysis of competitive effects is necessarily drawn 
from the same economic principles used by DOJ and FTC.  Our 
statutory mandates our different.  The Department of Justice and 
the FTC are to stop mergers that harm competition, whereas we are 
charged with promoting competition.  A merger could seriously in-
terfere with promoting competition without harming existing com-
petition as I will discuss in a minute.  The focus is also different.  
The antitrust agencies have developed a methodology that applies 
to all industries “one size fits all,” that is based on the notion that 
most markets tend to work the same way.  Later in the process, 
they get to the factors that are unique in a particular market.  Con-
versely, we have developed a method of analysis that draws on our 
unique expertise in communications markets; that begins with the 
economic factors that are special in these markets, these are often 
reflected in our rules and the policies we are attempting to fulfill.  
Then, we go through the standard competitive analysis using the 
general tools. 
Generally, we reach the same conclusions,62 but approaching 
the problem from each end provides a nice check.  Our society 
usually looks for redundancy when something is important, I do 
not think many people would complain that airports maintain du-
plicative air traffic control systems.  I also think that communica-
tions markets are important right now—they are the foundation for 
the information economy and this is a critical transition period as 
we attempt to create competition where it did not exist before. 
One reason that there is much more awareness of the FCC’s 
review of mergers is that the mergers between local telephone 
companies have presented a particular problem.63  The DOJ has 
 
61. See id. at 199. 
62. See id. at 196-197. 
63. See id. 
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said that these mergers are unlikely to violate the antitrust laws be-
cause of the way courts view potential competition.64  Since local 
telephone companies are not currently competing with each other 
and they are not in the process of entering each others markets, 
case law indicates that it will be very hard to show that mergers be-
tween local telephone companies violate the antitrust laws.  In es-
sence, they do not reduce competition since there is not any com-
petition to begin with.  In theory, all local telephone companies 
could merge into one big, national local telephone company and 
DOJ would be powerless to stop them. 
Now, from the FCC perspective, the local telephone companies  
have not been competing with each other in large part because it 
was against the law, and Congress clearly contemplated that they 
would compete with each other in the future—this is one of the as-
sumptions underlying the 1996 Act.65  As a result, we see mergers 
between LECs (“Local Exchange Carriers”) as potentially very 
threatening.  For example, the FCC found that Bell Atlantic would 
have competed with NYNEX in New York City but for their 
merger.  They offset this harm with other public benefits that 
should result in more competition, but we found harm where DOJ 
could not.66 
In fact, just as mergers between local telephone companies 
might interfere with an assumption of the 1996 Act, some merger 
might really interfere with the operation of this or other communi-
cations laws, even if they do not reduce competition in the eyes of 
the antitrust laws.  The FCC implements and enforces a number of 
very fundamental rules that are necessary for competitive markets 
to exist in the first place.  In fact, spectrum allocation and man-
agement is just like the assignment and enforcement of property 
rights:  without this very fundamental level of regulation nobody 
could reliably use the spectrum to provide services.  Other very 
important rules that facilitate competitive markets include number 
assignments, standard setting, and interconnection requirements. 
It is true that a merger that interferes with the basic regulation 
 
64. See id. at 199. 
65. See id. at 198 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21(a)(1994)). 
66. See id. at 203 
PANEL II.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:35 PM 
486 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 9:461 
needed for competitive markets will probably be seen by an anti-
trust agency as harmful to competition.  It is not at all clear, how-
ever, that they can easily address the problem through the antitrust 
laws.  Moreover, the FCC is probably better positioned to assess 
the likelihood that a merger could interfere with the operation of 
communications laws.  One example where we took the lead was 
when SBC, the local telephone company composed of former Bell 
System companies in Texas and other southwestern states, was 
rumored to be discussing a merger with AT&T.  Such a merger 
would have flatly violated Section 271 of the 1996 Act,67 which is 
the provision that replaced the Modified Final Judgment that pro-
duced the divestiture of AT&T.  As a result, it would have com-
pletely undermined the entire framework established by Congress, 
and the FCC made clear that it would not be inclined to approve 
such a merger before it even happened.68 
I am going to skip my last two points, which are some ways in 
which the FCC’s merger review process differs from industry to 
industry depending on the different underlying rules, and will just 
wrap up. 
MR. PATTERSON: Thank you.  Our final speaker, Mr. Joffe. 
MR. JOFFE: Thank you, I am happy to be here.  I find myself in 
the odd position of almost agreeing with Bill Baer, which is begin-
ning to worry me a little—but I will see if I can overcome it.  Bill 
and I could probably go around the country carrying on an Alpert 
and Leary kind of debate, but neither of us would want to be Alpert 
or Leary, so we would have to figure out someone else to be. 
I guess I am here today to say that I do think the antitrust laws are 
a better guide to making sure we get the right result than either regu-
lation, on the one hand, or some platonic, benevolent dictatorship 
which decides what is in the public interest, and I think the last 
twenty-five years in the media business has shown that to be the 
case.  As you remember, in the 1960s we had three networks and 
some local broadcast stations, and we had a vast wasteland.  Then, in 
 
67. See Section 271 of the 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 
Stat.) 56, 89 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 271).  For further discussion see Weiss & Stern, su-
pra note 6, at 209-10. 
68. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 6, at 210. 
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the 1970s, we had the growth of cable, supposedly a gatekeeper, and 
it provided lots of alternatives.69  It started as a means of delivering 
TV to the homes in places where reception was bad.  But then, in or-
der to sell cable, the cable operators began to vertically integrate and 
develop their own programming.  A lot of it was “narrowcasting,”—
aimed at narrow audiences rather than the broadcasting aimed at 
wide groups—to which broadcast television was appealing.70 
Local towns began regulating the rates of basic television.  So 
you had this odd situation where basic rates were regulated and pay-
television rates were not regulated and, consequently, moved up.  
Through the late 1970s you had very little in the way of new cable 
channels, a twelve or fourteen channel cable system was typical.71  In 
the early 1980s, when the federal government stopped local rate 
regulation, the number of channels just exploded.  You went from 
systems with twelve channels to systems with eighty and one hun-
dred channels.72  You went from people getting one pay service, like 
HBO or Showtime, to people who—now that the cable systems had 
enough capacity to carry or receive four, five and six pay services. Of 
course, we have seen multiplexing since then. 
So rates were deregulated.  Sure, rates went up, but there was an 
explosion in the amount of choice that people had, and I do not think 
anyone today would suggest that television is a vast wasteland.  One 
might not like all the programming, or think there should be other 
programming, but it is a far cry from when you had only three things 
at which you could look. 
The number of channels have increased, and now there are actu-
ally alternatives to cable including DBS, Direct TV, and Echo Star.  
Small dishes are very attractive. You no longer have to have some-
thing in your front yard which looks like a shield between your house 
 
69. See generally Robert F. Copple, Cable Television and the Allocation of Regula-
tory Power: A Study of Government Demarcation and Roles, 44 FED. COMM. L. J. 1, 22-
32 (1991) (discussing the rise of cable television stations and the conflicts between state 
and federal regulation). 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 172 n.54 (discussing cable penetration prior to FCC regulation). 
72. “As soon as the FCC allowed, the structure of the cable industry changed as 
group owners bought out and combined the early pioneering cable systems and prepared 
for an assault on the then-restricted top 100 markets.” Id. 
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and the road.  There is MMDS,  the telephone companies have gone 
into that.73  Through the Internet you now get video streaming, which 
provides other alternatives.  Sure, this is not perfect competition, but 
it really is working pretty well with the aid of the antitrust laws and 
antitrust enforcement—although one can argue about its application 
in any particular case. 
Let me turn for a second to the First Amendment.  I did catch the 
tail end of the last panel, and I said this personally to Andy 
Schwartzman, so I will now say it behind his back.  In the last several 
years I forgot how much I disagreed with Andy until I heard him 
again. 
The First Amendment, and I do not have to tell this to a bunch of 
law students, says Congress shall make no law.74  The First Amend-
ment is a limitation on government power—and it is been applied 
through the Fourteenth Amendment to the states.  But the First 
Amendment does not apply to private actors, and it has no clause in 
it like the Fourteenth Amendment, which allows Congress to enforce 
it.  It is a self-executing amendment that prohibits certain govern-
mental action. 
Now, there are other things beside the First Amendment that can 
be taken into account.  For example, the public interest, which is cer-
tainly one of the standards the FCC has to apply, and other values in 
our society.  But we should not kid ourselves that putting impositions 
on the media is a way of somehow vindicating the First Amendment.  
It is not vindicating the First Amendment at all.  It may be doing 
something else, but that is not what it is doing. 
Let me talk about a couple of things that Bill mentioned, because 
I do have to debate with him.  Cable overbuilds, for instance.  Now, I 
happen to have a small cable overbuild before the FTC.  It is so small 
 
73. Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service (“MMDS”) provides users with 
high speed wireless Internet access, but is not yet widely available. See Jonathan Black-
wood et. al. Hot or Hype: Are the Latest Technologies all They’re Cracked up to be?  Get 
the Straight Answers from the Experts, WINDOWS MAG., Mar. 1, 1999 
<http://www.winmag.com/library/1999/0301/fea0050c.htm> at 1 (visited Apr. 5, 1999). 
74. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”  Id. 
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it has not bubbled its way up to Bill yet, I do not think.  But let me 
give you a reason why some of the perceived ideas about cable over-
builds are not necessarily the case, and the numbers I am going to 
give you are just sort of illustrative—they are not the actual numbers. 
I will show you how regulation sort of messes things up.  It used 
to be the case that you could have, occasionally, two cable systems 
that were overbuilt with each other.75  This may have happened be-
cause two cable operators expanded into each other’s territory before 
they realized what they were doing, and their wires ran down the 
same streets.  After they stopped, they each got half as many custom-
ers as they had before, although their costs of wiring the street were 
the same.  They did tend to lower the prices in the overbuild area, be-
cause that was the only way they could try and get more customers 
and justify the expense of the cable down the street.76 
Then some people who thought they knew what was in the public 
interest issued regulations and passed laws which essentially required 
that a cable operator price the same everywhere in the franchise.  Did 
that cause the prices in the non-overbuild areas to go down?  No.  
What it did was cause the prices in the overbuild areas to go up to 
match the prices in the non-overbuild areas. 
So the case we have at the FTC at the moment involves a buyer 
with a modern cable system and let us, for the sake of discussion, say 
fifty cable channels, basic channels, which it is selling at twenty-five 
dollars.  The company it is trying to buy is an antiquated system, 
with about twenty channels, which it sells at the same price.  The two 
systems are only slightly overbuild, a few thousand subscribers, they 
have many thousand subscribers outside the overbuild area, and the 
basic prices are the same in the overbuild area and outside the over-
build area. 
The seller’s prices, pay prices, are the same inside the overbuild 
area and outside.  The buyer’s pay prices, both inside and outside the 
overbuild area, are lower than the seller’s prices, but slightly lower in 
the overbuild area than outside the overbuild area.  So if the deal 
were to go through, what would happen is, there are some subscrib-
 
75. See Shumadine, supra note 13, at 351-352. 
76. See id. (generally discussing the phenomenon that where there is an overbuild 
situation, there will be more price competition). 
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ers who, in the overbuild area, currently with the buyer and the pay 
services—to whom, presumably, the price might well go up, to the 
price outside the overbuild area, a few dollars. 
But, and this is the important but, with respect to the seller, the 
seller’s basic prices, which are the same inside and outside the 
area—that system will be upgraded.  Subscribers now, instead of get-
ting the smaller number of channels for the same price will get the 
larger number of channels.  And the pay prices, which are higher 
than the buyer’s prices—inside and outside the overbuild—will go 
down. 
So this is a situation where, I believe, eliminating the overbuild 
will actually end up in lower prices and better service for many more 
people than the few people whose prices might go up.  And the ques-
tion that Bill will eventually have to face, and if we cannot get it re-
solved, someone else will have to resolve is whether the antitrust 
laws allow that.  I would say that of course they do.  That whatever 
competition may be being eliminated in one place is more than being 
made up for somewhere else, and the FTC ought to exercise its dis-
cretion and allow that. 
Let me talk for a moment about Primestar, which is another in-
teresting example.  Cable created midpower DBS.77  These were six-
foot dishes, and, later, three-foot dishes, in the midpower range.  The 
Justice Department actually opposed, before the FCC, the cable op-
erators going into DBS, because it said they did not want cable in this 
new technology.78  Even though there was no one else at the time 
who wanted to go into it, even though there was no limit on the 
number of people. 
Anyway, the FCC allowed a group of cable operators represent-
ing, let us say, forty to fifty percent of the cable subscribers to go into 
midpower DBS.  In the meantime, Direct TV and EchoStar acquired 
high-power DBS, which goes to a smaller dish, has more channels, is 
 
77. See Scott Blake Harris, New DBS Rules: From the Sublime to the Political, 
SATELLITE COMM., Apr. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WESTLAW 9362701 (discussing 
the elimination of the distinction between DBS and FSS regulation and outlines the 
FCC’s proposal for new rules regarding DBS regulation). 
78. See id. 
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much more competitive with cable.79  A third spot opened up, the 
spot that Murdoch owned,80 and the question was whether Primestar, 
owned by these cable operators, could acquire it. 
The Justice Department blocked the acquisition because it argued 
that that scarce resource would be better off in the hands of one or 
the other of the high-power DBS operators—which would better en-
able them to compete against cable—than it would be to allow a third 
player into the DBS market.81  Therefore, you had a strange situation 
where the Justice Department was protecting the two DBS operators 
against a third competitor, supposedly in order to allow those com-
petitors to better compete against cable. 
One of the problems with the argument was that, there was no 
evidence that Primestar would not compete against cable.  The Jus-
tice Department argued that Primestar, in the past, had tended to sell 
its dishes mainly in non-cable areas.82  Well, that was because the 
dishes that Primestar was selling were these larger, ungainly 
dishes—which obviously do not compete with cable as well as a 
small dish. 
The other issue, of course, is that most of the country is not cov-
ered by those cable operators, and so Primestar would have no incen-
tive not to compete against cable operators in the, let us say, sixty-
percent of the country covered by other cable systems, or in the por-
tions of the country which are not covered by cable at all.83  So, sup-
posedly, in an effort to enhance competition, I think what really hap-
pened was a decision which was anti-competitive.  So that while I 
am a proponent of the application of the antitrust laws, in preference 
to regulation or platonic republics, sometimes even the antitrust en-
forcers, I believe, get it wrong.  But, you know, that happens. 
 
79. See John R. Wilke, Antitrust Suit Filed to Block Primestar Purchase, WALL ST. 
J., May 13, 1998, at A3; Paul Farhi & Mike Mills, Murdoch Satellite TV Deal Folds Un-
der U.S. Pressure, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1998, at C1. 
80. See id. 
81. See David Lieberman & Jane O’Donnell, Justice Lawyers Oppose Murdoch-
Primestar Deal, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 1998, at B1; Genevieve Wilkinson, Computers and 
Technology Regulators Telling Primestar DBS and Cable Don’t Mix, INVESTORS BUS. 
DAILY, July 6, 1998, at A10. 
82. See id. 
83. See U.S. Sues to Halt Murdoch and Primestar Deal, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, May 13, 1998, at C1. 
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One last point.  Again, my adversary is not in the room.  Andy in 
his last few words, discussed the problems that he saw with cable op-
erators preventing Internet providers from doing video streaming 
over cable lines.  Now, video streaming would be a way in which 
you might go onto the Internet, and you might essentially get the 
equivalent of a television programming service over your Internet 
service. 
Now, current cable systems are not capable of providing enough 
capacity for Internet service providers to put their video streaming 
over it.  So what a cable operator has to do—when he decides 
whether or not he or she wants to upgrade his system and spend, in 
the case of AT&T and TCI, billions of dollars converting coaxial ca-
ble to fiber-optic material84—is to say:  Am I prepared to invest all 
that if I am going to be forced to allow an Internet provider to come 
in on my line and compete against me, by providing the same pro-
gramming that I have to pay for?  When I do a contract with CNN, or 
ESPN, I have to pay for that programming.  Should I spend the bil-
lions of dollars, and then be forced by the FCC, or some local town, 
to essentially open up?  AT&T, of course, said it would not. 
The FCC recently decided that it would not force AT&T to do 
that as a condition of allowing the merger I to go through.  But I 
would just submit that even the notion that that would be a good 
thing to do really is sort of counterintuitive.  Why would anyone in-
vest that money, if you were then essentially going to take it away 
from them, by forcing it to open it up to their competitors?  So what 
might in the momentary glance seem like it is in the public interest, 
on analysis, in many cases, turns out that it is not. 
I guess I would just close by saying I do not want to be Dr. Pan-
gloss85—there are always improvements that can be made.  This is 
not the best of best of all possible worlds, but I do think things are 
working pretty well. 
MR. PATTERSON: Thank you, all.  Before we turn things over 
to the audience, I have a couple questions that might start some dis-
cussion.  But I would like to see—before that, even—if the panelists 
 
84. See Reinhardt Krause, Computers & Technology: AT&T Finds Way “Home” 
Through TCI Acquisition, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, June 25, 1998, at A8. 
85. The eternal optimist in Voltaire’s Candide 
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have questions or comments they would like to address to each other.  
No? 
To what extent should the antitrust laws and the FCC’s regula-
tory power be directed towards diversity of programming?  You 
know, it is perfectly possible for them, and for the antitrust in its con-
sumer-welfare standard, and for the FCC in its public-interest stan-
dard—to focus on this.  Often the merger considerations are: Is this 
going to raise prices to advertisers?  And I am not sure that advertis-
ers are a good proxy for consumers.  And should we be looking more 
directly at programming diversity?  And, is fifty channels going to be 
better than twenty. 
I guess, also, one problem this might raise is: are we looking at 
what consumers want, rather than what consumers need, as Mr. 
Grossman said? 
MR. GROSSMAN: Let me try a response on that.  I hate regula-
tion as well, but it seems to me broadcasters want it both ways.  They 
say:  Why is it not enough to just abide by the antitrust laws and for-
get about regulation?  And I think that is a fine idea, if the broadcast-
ers were willing to pay for the free publicly-owned frequencies that 
are worth hundreds of millions—in fact billions—of dollars that they 
are being given. 
If they auctioned off the frequencies, and the money went for a 
public dividend, in other words, went to the government then they 
should be allowed to do whatever they please.  But they are getting 
these things free of charge, and the FCC allocates them—and, there-
fore, has to have some criteria.  Traditionally, it is always been this 
public-interest criteria one of which is diversity of programming 
promises.  It never works, because, eventually, broadcasters end up 
doing whatever they want, anyway. 
I have a problem with this business of let us just compete and 
deal the antitrust department, unless you are also willing to do what 
everybody else does, which is to pay for the incredibly valuable dis-
tribution mechanism that you are using. 
Now, in direct answer to the question about should there be con-
cern about diversity of programming, the FCC cannot get into pro-
gram content.  But you can have one sort of fundamental notion, that 
the more diverse the ownership of the media, the more likely you are 
PANEL II.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:35 PM 
494 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 9:461 
to have at least some diverse programming.  And that is been kind of 
the underlying basis of the diversity standard. 
Of course, diversity of ownership does not guarantee diversity of 
content.  Television has an excess of sameness now—despite that 
underlying doctrine.  But one thing is sure: if you have fewer gate-
keepers, you are guaranteed to have less diversity of content. If the 
underlying principle of the First Amendment is: The more diversity 
of content, the more diversity of sources of information, the more an-
tagonistic sources that you have, the healthier our democracy.  Then 
you want to try to get as much diversity of ownership as you possibly 
can. 
That always comes into conflict with the other very simple-
minded basic rule, which is that every company hates to have compe-
tition.  And so every company is dying either by purchase or by driv-
ing the other guy out of business to have a monopoly.  Which, of 
course, is what the cable industry has at this point. 
MR. PATTERSON: Well, I think it is true that both the antitrust 
agencies and the FCC have focused on diversity of ownership.  But it 
is not obvious to me that it is true that less diversity of ownership al-
ways means less diversity of programming.  Since the remedies are 
generally structural we should be trying to keep concentration low; 
trying to prevent bottlenecks.  Maybe we should look more substan-
tively at what the results are of particular enforcement actions, to see 
if we, in fact, do get more programming diversity regardless of 
whether we get diversity of ownership. 
MR. JOFFE: Well, in the Turner merger we had an example that 
came close to this issue.  The FTC was concerned that Time War-
ner’s cable system would favor CNN, to the exclusion of other news 
sources.  So we entered into a consent decree that required us to put 
another all-news channel on half of our cable systems in a certain 
amount of time.86  We argued that that was unnecessary, because 
Time Warner cable only accounted for, let us say, fifteen percent of 
the cable subscribers in the country—and that Fox News and 
MSNBC could survive without access to our systems.  Even if, at 
 
86. See John R. Wilke, Acquisition Can Mean Long-Lived Antitrust Scrutiny, 
ARIZONA REP., Mar. 9, 1997, at D1; see also Business Wire Reports, Fox News Channel 
Detante Reached, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAPH, July 24, 1997, at 2. 
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worst, we did block them, which we said we had no intent to do, they 
could prosper without us.  But it was easier to meet Mr. Baer’s de-
mands than litigate about this for a year, so we entered into a consent 
decree. 
MR. GROSSMAN: I do not mean to take up a lot of time here, 
but I had some personal involvement or professional involvement 
with that.  The fact of the matter is that without that consent decree 
there would still be probably only one cable news channel.  Before 
the consent decree—when, for better or worse I was running NBC 
News—we tried to either start a new news channel that would be ca-
ble, many years ago, or buy CNN.  Ted Turner, who is one of the 
great people in the world, sold interest to Time Warner, TCI, and 
Cox, and thereby assured that there would be no competition to 
CNN. 
So it was not the people who decided what kind of cable news 
channel that they preferred, it was by virtue of the fact that the gate-
keepers controlled what went on, and they were not about to let a 
competing news channel diminish the value of the news channel in 
which they now owned an interest.  The fact is, when GE bought the 
bankrupt Financial News channel, and converted it into CNBC, one 
of the conditions of them getting accepted on the major cable 
MSO’s, and the major multiple systems, was that they would not 
provide a news service.87  And it was only because of the consent de-
cree that these other news services were allowed to flourish. 
MR. LANNING: Actually, I wanted to make two quick observa-
tions.  The first—although I guess I was being called regulation, or 
the FCC is being called regulation, I think that there ought to be a 
distinction drawn between sort of output regulation--by that I mean, 
prices shall be “X,” or, services shall be Y—and underlying sort of 
fundamental structural regulation, which I do not think anybody at 
this table is opposed to.  I mean, property rights, for example, are 
regulation, as are the criminal law. 
And unless you want to live in Bosnia, or Somalia or something, 
I think you like that kind of regulation.  There are some libertarians, 
some in Montana, for example, who are not fond of that kind of 
 
87. See Patrick McGeehan, The Peacock Spreads Into Cable; NBC’s Cable News 
Channel Takes to the Air This Month, N.J. RECORD, Apr. 9, 1989, at B1. 
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regulation—but regulation is not necessarily an evil thing.  Actually, 
the FCC is fairly active at trying to get out of the output-regulation 
business.  We are not very fond of price regulation and we would 
prefer structural regulation, that allows competitive markets to exist. 
The second point is, I hear this debate going on back and forth 
about the cable news situation.  It is related to what goes on in tele-
phone networks, and related to what may go on in the cable-Internet 
world.  But if you imagine these integrated companies—and integra-
tion often provides a lot of benefits.  One of the best examples is the 
development of cable programming that happened in the early 1980s.  
A lot of risk was taken, because there was sort of a guarantee of car-
riage.  There is also a flip side to that, though, and sort of what Mr. 
Grossman was getting at.  If I am a network company, if I am just 
running the cable network, I want to provide the programming that 
my consumers want.  And if I am a phone company, I do not really 
want to be limited to just one seller.  If I was just Bell Atlantic’s net-
work company, I do not really want just Bell Atlantic selling my ser-
vice.  I would like to have Time Warner, and AT&T, and anybody 
else who wants to sell my service sell it. 
Conversely, if I was just in the business of selling telephone ser-
vice to users—suppose I was American Express or somebody—I 
would not want to be limited to just one phone network.  I do not 
want to sell just Bell Atlantic.  I would actually like to find out if 
Time Warner would develop a competing capacity, and if I can find 
the best sort of platform for each particular application.  When you 
have integration, you have an inherent tension in the companies be-
tween each sort of not wanting the other to do what is naturally their 
want.  And that is sort of what is offset by the potential efficiencies 
of integration, which makes it a really difficult problem. 
MR. JOFFE: Could I respond to Mr. Grossman’s point?  Just two 
quick points.  And this is just an example of how I think there are 
two sides to every question.  CNBC essentially forced itself on the 
cable operators, in return for carrying their broadcast stations, once 
the must-carry retransmission law88 came through, and essentially 
 
88. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, §§ 614, 615, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-81 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 
(1994)); see also Robinson, supra note 51, at 933. 
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required the cable operators to take CNBC if they wanted to take 
NBC.  In return for that, the cable operators said: Fine, we will take 
you—but we want to know what it is we are paying for.  We do not 
want you to be able to switch the programming on us willy-nilly. 
So in their programming contracts there was a description of the 
kind of programming, which was different from the news program-
ming they already carried.  And, obviously, they wanted to keep that 
kind of programming, as opposed to allowing CNBC to switch to 
something else, which might already be carried and/or less desirable. 
Just one word in defense of Ted Turner.  Ted Turner got in-
volved, probably to his regret, with the cable operators when he 
ended up in perilous financial condition after investing hundreds of 
millions of dollars in buying the MGM library in the mid-1980’s.89  
At the verge of going bankrupt, and going under, he went around the 
country pleading for financial assistance—and none of the broadcast 
networks were willing to help bail him out. The ones who did bail 
him out were the cable operators, who obviously had an interest in 
seeing CNN survive, and help them distinguish themselves from 
broadcast television, and compete against broadcast television.  As a 
result of the ownership rights they got as part of that bailout, they 
created all sorts of difficulties for Mr. Turner, which eventually re-
sulted in a merger.90  Because there was always disagreement among 
Time Warner, TCI and Ted about what should happen, that is what 
led to Ted’s decision, essentially, to sell out and merge with Time 
Warner. 
MR. GROSSMAN: You are absolutely right—it depends on 
your perspective.  NBC offered to buy out Ted and solve his finan-
cial problems.91  But John Malone and Time Warner came in and 
said, when Turner was trying to raise his rates to the cable compa-
nies: We will buy you, as long as you guarantee to keep the rate low. 
Now, I am not saying that that would have been a good idea, by the 
way, for the public interest, but it probably would not have been any 
 
89. See Melissa Turner, Cable T.V.’s Close Ties to Turner Stir Unease: Critics Say 
Industry Controlled by Too Few, ATLANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 17, 1989, at 1. 
90. See Time Warner Signs FTC Order to Allow Acquisition of Turner, supra note 
19, at B8. 
91. See Keith Herndon, TBS Asks Cable Companies for Financial Help: Turner Of-
fers Stock for Cash to Ease Debts, ATLANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 10, 1987, at A01. 
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worse than having the cable companies own the network. 
MR. PATTERSON: Let me see if I can solicit some views on 
technological convergence.  The convergence idea is that pretty soon 
we are going to be able to get the same services over our phone lines 
as we get over our cable lines—may be as we get over our electrical-
utility lines.  Now there is this controversy about whether cable 
should be required to provide equal access—whether TCI should 
have to give access to all, say, Internet providers.  One of the argu-
ments for requiring the same policy across these various sorts of 
wires that enter the house or the business is that you do not want to 
put one of the industries at a disadvantage relative to the other. 
Now, on the other side of it, it seems to me, is the fact that we do 
not know which way is going to work best.  We do not know 
whether equal access is the best thing to apply, or whether we would 
be better off letting cable operate a little more freely.  So might it not 
be better to try, rather than treating all the industries the same, treat 
them explicitly differently. 
You know, we have a tradition of state federalism in the United 
States, perhaps we ought to try technological federalism, as well.  
Maybe force equal access on phone companies, but do not force it on 
the cable companies, and see which way it works out best—since we 
do not know. 
MR. JOFFE: I completely agree.  Treating people who are in dif-
ferent positions the same is unequal, which is not similar treatment.  
One area where I particularly agree with Mr. Grossman is, there is a 
big difference, for instance, between cable and broadcasters.  Broad-
casters are using the public’s airwaves—and, hence, there are obvi-
ously certain requirements that you can put on a broadcaster, which 
you would not put on a cable operator who has invested his hard-
earned money—or borrowed money—to run the wires under the 
street.  Essentially cable operators have paid for their means of dis-
tribution, which the broadcaster has not.  So you cannot treat the 
broadcaster and the cable operator the same.  They are in different 
positions. 
So I think the only rule here that really makes sense is: You have 
to think very carefully about what you are doing, but you cannot treat 
everyone exactly the same. 
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MR. GROSSMAN: I agree with that—but I go back to where I 
began, which is I feel sorry for the FTC and the FCC, and the Justice 
Department, trying to sort this out.  I mean, if you do require the 
telephone companies, to provide universal service, you know that if 
the telephone service comes through the cable lines, that the cable 
guys have skimmed off the cream.  That only seventy percent, not 
one hundred percent, of the population that has access to cable, 
which actually subscribes to cable, that maybe can afford to sub-
scribe to cable.92 
So now you are giving a particular advantage to the AT&T-TCI 
group, because they do not have to worry about the poor people or 
the slums.  They only deal with people who can afford to pay a lot of 
money for telephony, and that ends up screwing the telephone com-
panies.  How do you deal with it?  I do not have the foggiest idea. 
AOL has the same problem.  If you have to first subscribe to ca-
ble and take AT&T’s Internet access service, and pay extra to get 
AOL, then you are really putting AOL at a tremendous competitive 
disadvantage if things start going through cable.  And these are very 
troublesome and difficult, and not one-sided arguments.  Of course, 
what you want to do, if you are a cable operator, or the cable operator 
combined with the telephone operator, is make sure that you do 
screw AOL, you know?  That everybody is forced to take the Inter-
net through the AT&T, Time Warner, whatever portals. 
MR. BAER: I just want to endorse Mr. Grossman’s suggestions, 
that you really ought to feel sorry for the federal enforcers.  You lis-
ten to people who are as articulate and effective advocates as Bob 
Joffe endorsing the principle of antitrust enforcement, but who al-
ways finds a reason why it ought not to be applied in the specific 
case involving his specific client. 
 
92. See Federal Communication Commission, Fifth Annual Assessment of the Status 
of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, (visited Apr. 13, 
1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/fcc98335.pdf>.  A total of 76.6 mil-
lion households subscribed to multichannel video programming services as of June 1998, 
up 4.1 percent over the 73.6 million households subscribing to MVPDs in June 1997.  
This subscriber growth accompanied a 2.3 percentage point increase in multichannel 
video programming distributors’ penetration of television households to 78.2 percentage 
in June 1998.  During this period, the number of cable subscribers continued to grow, 
reaching 65.4 million as of June 1998 up about 2 percentage over the 64.2 million cable 
subscribers in June 1997. Id. at 5. 
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But the fact of the matter is that we are in a very messy situation 
right now, moving from a mostly regulated environment to a mostly 
deregulated environment.  We have unequal situations.  We have 
scarcity with respect to the broadcast spectrum and elsewhere, which 
creates some allocation issues.  We do not have that with respect to 
other things.  We have competing ways of getting information into 
the home, or getting the home access to information, that are not 
quite comparable.  They are competing with each other on one sense, 
but they are different. 
And so it is a complicated, difficult environment we are sorting 
out.  Part of the approach—that I tried to take in my opening re-
marks—is simple to say: It is clear to me, having been at this job for 
four years, that antitrust is not the answer to everything.  That it is the 
issues, the public-policy choices, that need to be made are broader 
than antitrust.  Antitrust, and a belief in competition as the most ef-
fective allocator of resources, does not mean we get, an ideal alloca-
tion of resources. 
Larry Grossman’s point, that one result, often, of imperfect com-
petition is dumbing everything down—lowest-common-denominator 
program.  We are denied some quality.  What we need to do with the 
Congress of the United States is figure out how we are going to en-
sure that the imperfections in a competitive marketplace, which 
probably are preferable to a regulated marketplace, how we deal with 
those in a way that makes sure we protect values that go beyond the 
values that are enshrined in the antitrust laws. 
MR. PATTERSON: Any questions from the audience? 
QUESTION: Yes, I have got one.  Let me just preface it by say-
ing in a lot of areas where I work, and where my firm works, we deal 
with issues where antitrust is one part of an issue, and there is an in-
tellectual-property element on the other side.  Because intellectual 
property, of course, does create something that is not exactly a mo-
nopoly, that, in some ways, seems like a monopoly.  Particularly af-
ter some recent decisions, there seems to be a trend where certain as-
pects of intellectual property are going to become increasingly 
important in the domain in which this convergence is taking place.  
So with that rather elaborate justification for myself, I simply ask 
whether you see intellectual-property laws and conduct as being a 
wild card in all of this that you are discussion, or whether, in fact, 
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this will remain through a different domain in your world. 
MR. BAER: Well, let me start.  I do not think they are going to 
be in a different domain.  I mean, one has to look at the intersection 
of competition principles and intellectual property.  In just about 
every case we do, you see some of that going on.  In the Microsoft 
case being tried down in Washington—we have got a case involving 
Intel that involves, you know, how far one can go in enforcing one’s 
patent rights, or extracting patent rights from others.  So there is a 
necessary intersection.  But having a policy which says antitrust, you 
know, is opposed to accumulations of market power, but recognizes 
that the Constitution, and various laws Congress has enacted, have 
created exceptions to that, and given people prosecutor rights in or-
der to preserve incentives to innovate.  There are ways to reconcile 
the rights that intellectual property laws convey, while still managing 
to use the antitrust laws to avoid people unfairly extending the rights 
they have into areas where they ought to be competing on merit. 
MR. PATTERSON: I think one area in which it is a wild card, 
though, is that as, in the new industries creates new sorts of prob-
lems, then so we have creations of new kinds of intellectual property.  
Like the effort to pass a database-protection law last year, and 
Europe’s passage of such a law.  And so as the industries change, 
new forms of intellectual protections, that are not copyright, patent or 
trademark are going to come into play, and it is going to be hard to 
predict how that is going to play out. 
Any other questions?  I had like to thank the panelists very much, 
and thank you all for coming. 
 
